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In a flurry of activity over the last nine months, the United States 
has rediscovered the strategic value of the freely associated 
states in Micronesia. This In Brief is in two parts: in the first I 
examine the geopolitical context of the United States’ relations 
with the freely associated states, including China’s interest in 
the region; in the second I describe how the United States is 
updating its Pacific Islands policy, both in the freely associated 
states and in the region more generally. 
The United States has recently opened negotiations on 
renewing key provisions of the Compacts of Free Association 
with the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of Palau (Palau). 
Each compact is a deal under which the island state receives 
development assistance and visa-free access for its citizens 
to the United States for an agreed period. In return, the United 
States has a strategic monopoly on the Micronesian states in 
perpetuity. In addition, the RMI permits the United States to test 
missiles at Kwajalein atoll and Palau guarantees the United States 
the future use of certain defence sites (US GAO 2018, 2002). 
These arrangements, which date from the 1980s, foreclose 
the region to the military forces of other nations and permit 
United States forces to range at will in its waters, lands and 
airspace. As the then commander of United States forces in the 
Pacific Admiral William J. Crowe pointed out in 1985, the:
delegation of defense responsibilities and authority to 
the USA, together with the provisions that the freely 
associated states will refrain from any action the USA 
determines to be inconsistent with defense and security 
requirements, provides the latitude needed to support 
our security interests (Crowe 1985). 
Thirty-five years later, a report commissioned under the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 has come to a 
similar conclusion: 
Taken together, the security and defense provisions 
of the Compacts form an essential foundation for US 
national security interests in the region. In particular, as a 
consequence of these security and defense provisions, 
the Compacts deny an enormous and strategically 
important section of the Western Pacific to potential US 
adversaries, while enabling U.S. presence and power 
projection in the region (Grossman et al. 2019:xi). 
The strategic interests of the United States have been 
central to its relationship with the Micronesian region since 
World War II, when American forces captured the islands from 
Japan and proceeded to use the area for a variety of military 
purposes, above all the testing of nuclear weapons at Bikini and 
Enewetak atolls from 1946 to 1958, leaving behind a legacy 
of radioactive contamination, but also the testing of missiles at 
the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Site at Kwajalein, 
the world’s largest atoll. The defense site is increasingly being 
used for space operations and the protection of military 
space operations that support the United States Indo-Pacific 
Command, perpetuating a United States official tradition that 
tends to see the islands stretching from the Marshalls to Palau 
as little more than United States assets that happen to have 
local populations. As it should, the United States Department 
of the Interior continues to fund the Four Atoll Health Program, 
which supports health care clinics for about 20,000 people on 
the four ‘radiation atolls’ of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and 
Utrok, as well as in Majuro (Pacific News Center 6 March 2020). 
Yet, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal established under the compact 
to compensate Marshallese victims of the nuclear tests closed 
in 2010, leaving some claims unpaid. Subsequent attempts to 
litigate further compensation at the International Court of Justice 
and the US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have failed. 
The strategic interests of external powers have been the 
enduring context of international relations in the Pacific since the 
19th century. At that time, the map of global influence—Britain 
dominant, France expansionist, Germany and the United States 
rising—was reproduced in the territorial partitions of the late 
colonial period. Since the 1960s, we have seen a weakened 
Britain leaving, a global middle power France retaining its small 
territories, a stronger Australia becoming the major aid partner 
and the hegemon the United States preserving its strategic 
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position north of the equator, where its control and preponderant 
influence stretches from the state of Hawai‘i west through the 
freely associated states to Guam and the Northern Marianas. 
It is hardly surprising that the phenomenon of our own 
age—the rise of China—should have re-alerted external states 
to their strategic positions in the region, especially given that 
Pacific Island states are claiming a new independence in 
foreign policy and diplomatic alignment (Fry 2019:276–303). 
Such a reassessment is particularly true of the United States in 
evaluating its strategic position in Micronesia.
Among the freely associated states, the FSM is where China 
matters most. China was one of the first countries to recognise 
the FSM after it gained independence and, in 1989, the FSM was 
among the first Pacific Island countries to recognise China. Since 
then, and increasingly in recent years, Chinese development 
assistance to the country has resembled that in other parts of 
the Pacific Islands, including an agricultural pilot farm in Pohnpei, 
bridges in Pohnpei and Kosrae, a high school in Kosrae, the 
new state office buildings complex and road upgrades in Chuuk, 
a gymnasium, a cargo vessel, an aircraft and a stream of 
scholarships for young Micronesians to study in China (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 28 May 
2019). Projects of this kind offer work to Chinese companies 
such as the Sichuan Road and Bridge Group Corporation, which 
built the Okat Bridge in Kosrae. China has also contributed 
to the FSM Trust Fund, which is supposed to give it financial 
independence by 2023. At the same time, Chinese companies 
are major players in the vast fisheries of the FSM, and have 
attempted—though so far with little success—to develop a major 
tourist industry in Yap. In return, the FSM is committed to the 
One China policy, signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative and 
sends representatives to the annual Belt and Road Forums. 
From the official American point of view, the steady expansion 
of China’s commercial and aid presence in the Micronesian 
region is a strategic threat demanding to be countered in the 
United States’ national interest. 
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